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Abstract: A doyen of profound discussions on the Indian 
philosophy of language, Bhartṛhari (fl. 500 – 700 CE) 
introduced in the light of the Advaita Vedanta system of 
philosophy a major theory known as the indivisibility 
thesis (akhaṇḍapakṣavāda) of meaning. His expertise in 
Sanskrit grammar rooted in the time-honored tradition 
bolstered with applied approach to the language in use 
enabled him to establish firmly this theory. Some later 
grammarians in the mainstream Pāṇinian grammatical 
tradition and Vedantic philosophers modelled their 
theories on Bhartṛhari's approach to sentential meaning, 
while some others criticized him for misusing the 
Advaita Vedantic theology and its standard line of 
arguments in order to justify the indivisibility of 
meaning, whereas primacy of words cannot be 
ascertained in any context of language use. This paper 
examines the background of Bhartṛhari's arguments for 
the legitimacy of his claim that sentence meaning is the 
primary entity, which is divisible neither syntactically 
nor semantically. It also seeks to justify that his approach 
to the indivisibility thesis deserves a significant position 
among the early thoughts on the derivation of meaning 
and its composition. 
Key words: Sentential Meaning, Bhartṛhari, 
indivisibility thesis (akhaṇḍapakṣavāda), 
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1 Introduction 
Bhartṛhari considered to have flourished between 
the fifth and seventh centuries CE in India could be 
the most significant linguist who had a clearly 
distinguishable philosophy of his own. Several 
works have been ascribed to Bhartṛhari since the 
Bhartṛhari who was a philosopher-grammarian is 
also believed to be the Bhartṛhari who wrote 
several poetical works. However, the VP 
(Vākyapadīya), which literally means ‘one that 
treats of sentence(s) and word(s)’ alias the 
Trikaṇḍī, i.e. ‘one that is constituted of three 
sections’ is the most momentous treatise by 
Bhartṛhari. Despite numerous uncertainties1 about 
his date, Bhartṛhari can be introduced as a Sanskrit 
grammarian of the mainstream initiated by Pāṇini 
plus a philosopher of the non-dualistic (Advaita) 
Vedānta tradition. Further, he stands significant in 
the history of Indian philosophy of language and 
grammar because he was a firm upholder of the 
                                                          
1 Coward & Raja, 1990, p. 22; Houben, 1995, pp. 3-10; 
Iyer, 1969, p. 3; Śāstrī, 1959, p. 56. 
language in flux and its practical usage. Unlike 
most of the Sanskrit grammarians attempted to 
impose rules to rectify, limit or even to stop the 
flux of the language, Bhartṛhari observed the 
language flow in keeping with the changes in 
anthropological, social and cultural settings it is 
used in and then provided it with a philosophical 
interpretation. He did not tolerate clinging blindly 
to the already established normative grammar 
which is purposively taught to a language user but 
rather promoted the practicality of the language and 
the benefits of learning the language as it has been 
in practice. Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of language is 
neither entirely separated from nor merged into 
Advaita Vedānta school of Indian philosophy. 
Given the logical organization of its content, his 
system of philosophy was one with its own identity 
remodeled by Bhartṛhari himself but its underlying 
structure was borrowed from the well-established 
Advaita Vedānta tradition. However, this is not to 
exaggerate that Bhartṛhari individually established 
a completely novel school of philosophy without 
being influenced by his predecessors at all. Rather, 
he developed a new line of thoughts on the 
language and grammar and shaped it in the mould 
of Advaita Vedānta so that it could stand on its 
own feet with due respect to the traditionalism.2 
That new line of thoughts has such an account of 
peculiar characteristics that it deserves to be 
designated as a new philosophy. This paper 
examines the background of Bhartṛhari's arguments 
for the legitimacy of his claim that sentence 
meaning is the primary entity, which is divisible 
neither syntactically nor semantically, akin to the 
non-duality in Vedanta. It also seeks to justify that 
his approach to the indivisibility thesis deserves a 
significant position among the early thoughts on 
the derivation of meaning and its composition. 
One finds three terms in the VP that must not be 
misinterpreted in the light of their English 
counterparts. Out of them it is vital in interpreting 
and understanding the philosophy of Bhartṛhari that 
we first have very clear understanding of what the 
‘śabda’ and the ‘vākya’ are. Literally translated, 
they are the ‘sound’ and the ‘sentence’ 
respectively. The Sanskrit grammarians of the 
                                                          
2 For Bhartṛhari’s respect to the tradition, see: VP. 2. 485 
- 487. 
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Pāṇinian tradition including Patañjali3 primarily 
use them in that sense. Bhartṛhari does not entirely 
deviate from his predecessors’ path but in his 
system of philosophy expands the semantic scope 
of both terms so that each includes two senses as 
discussed below. The other term, ‘vyākaraṇa’, is 
also bisemous but the sense more frequently and 
emphatically employed is ‘the natural way of 
language use’ which fully accords with social 
convention rather than ‘the grammar’ normatively 
followed without enough concern about its 
practical application. 
The śabda, for Bhartṛhari, is both (a) the audible 
sounds we orally produce and listen to and (b) the 
eternal speech principle, the cause of the real world 
or the sphoṭa. Consequently, he tends to use the 
terms dhvani and nāda synonymously4 when he 
refers only to the former sense by the term ‘śabda’. 
Since Bhartṛhari’s major focus is on the latter 
sense, his philosophy is also known as the 
‘Śabdādvaitavāda’, the theory of the non-duality of 
the eternal speech principle. The śabda as found in 
his philosophy is a lavish improvement of what 
Patañjali refers to as ‘nityaśabda’. The vākya also 
bears the sense ‘the eternal speech principle’ in 
addition to its general sense, the sentence. This is 
of utmost significance in Bhartṛhari’s philosophy 
since taking the vākya to be the eternal speech 
principle, the Śabda or the sphoṭa is the foundation 
on which he establishes that ‘the idea’ we 
understand from a linguistic expression cannot be 
divided into constituents. As a result, it is 
inaccurate and misleading to interpret that 
Bhartṛhari only postulates the ‘indivisibility of the 
sentence as a string of linguistic components’.  
2 The Vākya  
Bhartṛhari’s reinterpretation of the ‘vākya’ is the 
distinguished subject matter of the complete VP. 
The kārikās VP. 2. 325 - 327 succinctly state that 
to have a samāptārtha or a ‘perfected meaning’ 5 is 
the essential quality for any linguistic form to 
become, in Bhartṛhari’s usage of the term, a vākya. 
Having acquired this quality, any linguistic form 
which can syntactically be distinguished as a 
                                                          
3 Patañjali takes the śabda to be the audible sounds 
(dhvani) by means of pronouncing which the 
understanding of the thing-meant becomes possible. 
MBh (Mahābhāṣya). 1. 1. 6 – 13. 
4 Iyer, 1982, p. 43. 
5 Cf. VP. 2. 326; 2. 450; 3. 701: This English rendering 
of the Sanskrit term samāptārthatā may be quite similar 
to that of ‘perfecta oratio’ as explained by the medieval 
philosopher Peter Abelard but we need more in-depth 
studies before we can say if they are genuine parallels. 
See: Gaskin, 2008, p. 23; Kelly, 2002, p. 166. 
morpheme, word, phrase, clause or a sentence only 
in grammatical analysis, becomes so semantically 
saturated that it never desires such another unit (or 
more units) to perfect its meaning.6 Similarly, put 
the other way round, if a certain linguistic unit is 
capable of bringing forth a ‘complete unified 
meaning’, it never matters whether the unit in 
question is ‘a constituent of a sentence’ (noun, 
verb, adjective, preposition etc.) or a ‘collection of 
such elements’, i.e. sentence. What matters is thus 
whether or not the very unit could give us a 
‘perfected meaning’ (samāptārtha).7 Further, the 
‘sentence’ needs not to be a series of linguistic 
forms since even one word could bear a rounded-
up meaning without expectancy for any more.8 
What follows is a brief discussion on this matter. 
 
I suggest that the English term ‘sentence’ may 
become quite misleading, in the sense 
‘semantically incomprehensive’, in defining the 
term vākya in Sanskrit. Likewise, to render ‘vākya 
holism’ acceptable to Bhartṛhari as ‘sentence 
holism’9 might muddle up the entire indivisibility 
thesis. The English terms in this regard such as 
‘sentence, assertion, proposition10 or statement’ 
                                                          
6 VPpr (Vākyapadīya: Helārāja’s Commentary - 
Prakāśa). 2. 318: further includes the following.  
na hi kiñcit padaṃ nāma rūpeṇa niyataṃ kvacit | 
padānāmartharūpaṃ ca vākyādeva jāyate 
 (There is nothing known as a word with a fixed form. 
The meaning of the words and their forms arise from the 
sentential meaning itself). 
7 VPpr. 2. 326 confirms that samāptārtha is 
paripūrṇārtha. Here caritakriya or the embedded 
semantic move in the form of the predicate is discussed.   
8 In VP. 2. 445 - 447, it is discussed whether the 
comprehension of the perfected sentential meaning 
expects the all linguistic forms being heard or the all 
semantic moves (kriyā) being understood. Since a 
semantic move like ‘cooking’ may include a series of 
other semantic moves such as washing the cooking 
utensils, chopping vegetables etc. but is understood as 
including them all, the ‘reciprocal desire of the linguistic 
units for more such units to become semantically 
saturated (ākāṅkṣā)’ ceases to exist even when such 
linguistic units of those semantic moves are not 
physically heard.  
9 This is how most writers introduce akhaṇḍapakṣavāda 
in Bhartṛhari’s terminology, which does not provide 
enough clarity to the confusion whether they employ the 
term ‘sentence’ only considering the surface literary 
sense of the vākya in Sanskrit or also including its 
extended sense as in the VP . Cf. Bhattacharya, 2002, p. 
61; Ganeri, 2001, p. 111; Matilal, 1990, p. 106; Patnaik, 
1994, p. 139.  
10 Since what is intended by the term ‘proposition’ is not 
exactly fixed, many writers on Bhartṛhari use it with 
caution to denote what is intended by the Sanskrit term 
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have their own demarcations in terms of the current 
usage in common unspecified contexts and none of 
them is exactly identical to the Sanskrit term vākya 
in a number of aspects. The term vākya might be 
introduced with a special combination of some of 
the criteria that decide what is referred to by the 
English terms cited above but it would be far better 
if we attempt to define the vākya after recognizing 
its own properties.  
2. 1 Definitions of the Vākya before Bhartṛhari 
The most obvious fact given in any general 
definition of the English term ‘sentence’ is that ‘a 
series of linguistic components makes a 
sentence’.11 In other words, syntactical relations 
must play the major role in defining what a 
sentence is.12 The philosophers before Bhartṛhari 
too were of the opinion that a set of words build up 
a sentence because their foci lay more strongly on 
the grammatical perfection rather than the semantic 
unambiguousness of an expression. From the 
Nyāya philosophers13 to the logicians of the recent 
history like Annambhaṭṭa14 and 
                                                                                    
‘vākya’. Cf. Aklujkar, 2001, p. 471. fn. 31. However, 
‘proposition’ as explicated in the western philosophical 
discourses on the language may well sit close to the 
vākya in its broadest sense as discussed above. Further 
research on the accuracy of employing vākya and 
‘proposition’ indiscriminately is necessary to confirm or 
reject this likely conformity though some scholars have 
already employed the term ‘proposition’ to translate 
some Sanskrit terms in the Indian philosophy of language 
and logic; for example: vākya in Bhartṛhari’s linguistic 
monism as ‘complete self-contained proposition’ [Śāstrī, 
1980, p. 22; Miśra, 1972, p. 321], atideśavākya, 
udāharaṇa and siddhaparavākya in logic as ‘assimilative 
proposition, universal proposition and assertive 
proposition conveying something that is already 
descriptive’ respectively [Grimes, 1989, pp. 67, 227, 292 
respectively], pratijñā in Nyāya logic as ‘proposition’ 
[Worthington, 1982, p. 65].  Cf. Gaskin, 2008, pp. 8-14: 
‘proposition’ as employed by the medieval philosophers 
and their predecessors, not in the sense modern analytical 
philosophers use it.  
11 However, the original etymology of the term 
‘sentence’ appears not to be limited to the sense ‘a series 
of linguistic components or a construction with a finite 
verb’ but to be rather rich in the sense the term vākya 
bears. Sentence < Latin sentīre (to feel), sententia 
(thought, meaning, judgment, opinion) < PIE *sent- (to 
take a direction, go; to feel). Cf. Pokorny, 1959, 908. 
12 Tesniere, 1959, p. 14; Bloomfield, 1933, p. 184; 
Chomsky, 1957, 3. 
13 NM (Nyāyamañjarī). 2. 143 kimapi punaridaṃ 
padaṃ nāma, kiñca vākyamityuktamatra varṇasamūho 
padaṃ padasamūho vākyamiti  (Again, what is this 
known as a word? why is it said to be a sentence? A set 
of syllables is a word and a set of words a sentence). 
14 TarS (Tarkasaṅgraha), Tripati & Bhandare edition, 
1974, p. 50. 
Laugākṣibhāskara,15 many took the sentence to be 
‘a set of words’ (padasamūha) or a collection of 
syntactically individual constituents. The very idea 
that philosophers are not satisfied with what 
grammarians accept as ‘being perfect’ is a 
widespread notion in the Indian philosophy of 
language as well.16 Grammatical perfection in a 
certain linguistic expression does not invariably 
stand for its ‘entire perfection’ as the latter type of 
perfection lies beyond the ‘taught-and-learnt’ rules 
of prescriptive grammar. Thus, the sheer 
syntactical combination of a grammatical subject, 
an object and a verb is not always taken to be 
semantically perfect though that very set of words 
may be strictly following all the necessities of 
grammatical syntax. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, a leading figure 
in the Indian philosophy of grammar, elucidates 
this facet of the language in the Nāmārthanirṇaya 
section of his Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa by using a 
number of examples on how a grammatically 
accurate sentence might look absurd in terms of 
semanticality. Similarly, a language can also 
include the words for the things unreachable by the 
mind or not existent such as vandhyāputra (barren 
woman’s son), śaśaviṣāṇa (hare’s horn), khapuṣpa 
/ ākāśapuṣpa / gaganakusuma (flower in the 
firmament)17 or circular square.18  
The Mīmāṃsā philosophers make use of three 
major criteria necessary for the semantic perfection 
of a linguistic expression, namely; ākāṅkṣā 
(reciprocal desire for more units),19 yogyatā 
(logical consistency) and āsatti or sannidhi (logical 
proximity) more skillfully in their exposition of 
                                                          
15 TK (Tarkakaumudī). Chatterji edition, 1982, 44. 
16Cf. Strawson, 1992, p. 7. ‘[J]ust as the grammarian 
…labours to produce a systematic account of the 
structure of rules which we effortlessly observe in 
speaking grammatically, so the philosopher labors to 
produce a systematic account of the general conceptual 
structure of which our daily practice shows us to have a 
tacit and unconscious mastery…’  [my emphasis 
italicized].  
17 Cf. BṛU (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad)). 1. 2. 1 na hi 
bhavati gaganakusumacchanno vandhyāputra iti ; MU 
(Muṇḍakopaniṣad). 7. 3. 28 vandhyāputro na tattvena 
māyayā vāpi jāyate ; Also Cf. YV (Yogavasiṣṭha). 3. 7. 
20; 4. 74, 75 and profusely in the Buddhist works like LS 
(Laṅkāvatārasūtra). 2. 27 khapuṣpa, 2. 164 
vandhyāputra . 
18 Matilal, 1968, p. 20; Raja, 1969, p. 165. 
19 MS (Mīmāṃsāsūtra). 2. 1. 46 arthaikatvādekaṃ 
vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt 
Bhartṛhari also accepts that the ‘sentence’ is a 
semantically single unit where reciprocal desire of the 
sentential components for more components in quest of 
perfection is satisfied. Cf. VP. 2. 4 sākāṅkṣāvayavaṃ 
bhede parānākāṅkṣaśabdakam |karmapradhānaṃ 
guṇavadekārthaṃ vākyamiṣyate Cf. VP. 2. 48.  
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meaning. The first two share the properties of both 
the constituents and the perceiver’s process of 
understanding while the third can be a property 
either of physical syntax or mental syntax. Even if 
a linguistic expression might have already acquired 
all grammatical necessities for accuracy, it might 
be lacking ‘perfection’ in semantic terms. A later 
logician Keśavamiśra in his Tarkabhāṣā 20 also 
asserts the significance of the aforementioned 
threefold criteria of ‘a set of words’ if it is to be 
accepted as a vākya which is saturated both 
grammatically and semantically. Thus, as 
Kumārilabhaṭṭa21 rightly points out, the vākya is 
not only what the traditional Sanskrit grammarians 
called it to be but also something more. These 
criteria and their functions elevate an expression, 
be it grammatically saturated or not, to a 
semantically perfect vākya but it is not attempted to 
explain them here in detail.22  
When defining the vākya, the ancient Indian 
grammarians attempted to find how different it is 
from the smaller linguistic units. Those units are 
primarily padas and varṇas i.e. words and syllables 
respectively. The grammarians’ attempt was to 
consider the grammatical function of a vākya while 
their attention to its semantic aspect appears to 
have been relatively subordinate to the first. In his 
Vārtika, Kātyāyana introduces the vākya as ‘ekatiṅ’ 
i.e. (a structure) with only one finite verb.23 
Although Pāṇini’s Samartha theory of syntax 24 
implies that a sentence may have more than one 
finite verb (tiṅ) as in the expression ‘paśya, sūryaḥ 
udayati’ (look, the sun rises) which consists of an 
imperative and a finite verb describing the subject’s 
                                                          
20 TBh (Tarkabhāṣā) Paranjape edition, 2005, p. 121. 
vākyaṃ tu ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhimatāṃ padānāṃ 
samūhaḥ.  
21 TV (Tantravārtika). 1. 455; the immediate sequence 
(anantaraśruti) of the sentence-components is not 
enough as these criteria as irreplaceable. ākāṅkṣā 
saṃnidhānaṃ ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam | 
sambandhakāraṇatvena kḷptaṃ nānantaraśrutiḥ. 
22 For a brief account with examples, see: Raja, 1969, 
pp. 151 – 169. 
23 P (Pāṇinīya Aṣṭādhyāyī). 2. 1. 1.7; Tiṅ is the technical 
meta-term in Sanskrit grammar to introduce the identity 
of a ‘finite verb’. Tiṅ-anta (that ends with a -ti) is thus a 
verb. Nouns are termed as ‘sup-anta’ as the last case 
ending (locative plural) in declining nominal roots is ‘–
su’. The special letters ‘-ṅ’ and ‘-p’ appended to ‘ti-’ and 
‘su-’ respectively are ‘it’ letters which denote that the 
stems/ roots undergo further changes in line with the 
rules of conjugation and declension. Having a finite verb 
in the syntactic structure is also one of the key definitions 
of the English term ‘sentence’.  
24 P. 2. 1. 1 samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ ; 8. 1. 28 tiṅatiṅaḥ ; 
For details, see: Mahavir, 1984, pp. 89-92, and Singh, 
1997, p. 1587.  
action, it is as such only when we consider the 
whole complex as a semantically single and 
indivisible unit. Syntactically, in the above 
example in Sanskrit, the imperative works as one 
simple sentence and the rest as another.25 In 
Patañjali’s interpretation, the imperative in such a 
sentence is the preliminary sentence which brings 
forth the meaning of whole expression. The rest 
remains as an adjectival phrase to the imperative.26 
That is to say that the verb udayati (rises) in the 
example becomes a participial attributive or acts 
adjectivally to sūrya (which is the object of the 
activity of looking at). Accordingly, our example 
may translate as ‘look at the rising sun’.27 
Furthermore, the imperative ‘paśya’ (look!) is 
wanting in an object as it can be questioned, for 
example, that ‘what is it to look at’ and also the 
affirmative ‘(sūryaḥ) udayati’ may lead to the 
question that ‘well, then what do you want me to 
do?’ Consequently, both verb forms of that 
sentence expect each other and are required in 
order for the expression to convey the complete 
meaning. As for Bhartṛhari, in a sentence with only 
one verb form (ekatiṅ), the meaning cannot be 
comprehended unless that verb form is grasped. 
Consequently, such a sentence is marked by the 
niyatalakṣana because of the singleness of the idea 
that the speaker desires to convey.28 Bhartṛhari’s 
position is therefore that, even though there can be 
several verb forms in a vākya, the unity of the 
semantic whole or the ‘state of being a single 
vākya’ (ekavākyatā) remains unaffected because it 
is the meaningfulness that is desired but not 
whether the vākya under discussion is in 
conformity with the normative grammatical 
structure.29  
                                                          
25 Among the linguists’ definitions of the ‘sentence’, the 
pause preceding and following an uttered expression is 
also recognized as a significant criterion. Accordingly, if 
a certain piece of speech independent in terms of 
meaning is found between two pauses, that expression 
can be recognized as a sentence. See: Hirst & Cristo, 
1998, pp. 175, 240, 284. The Pāṇinian example here can 
be understood as a single sentence composed of two 
sentences also because a pause is often made after this 
type of imperative in natural human speech.  
26 MBh. I. 367. 10 - 368. 24  ākhyātaṃ sāvyayaṃ 
sakārakaṃ sakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyasaṃjñaṃ bhavati 
vaktavyam 
27 Cf. VPpr. 2. 444: for a discussion on another classic 
example; mṛgaḥ paśyata yāti.  
28 VPpr. 2. 443 niyatalakṣaṇamiti 
vivakṣitaikatvamityarthaḥ. 
29 VP. 2. 442, Cf. VPpr. on the same kārikā : satsu api 
bahuṣu tiṅanteṣu arthasya sākāṅkṣatvāt tatraikavākyatā 
eva iṣyate. 
ISSN: 2321-8819 (Online) 2348-7186 (Print) Impact Factor: 1.498 Vol. 7, Issue 7, July, 2019  
22 







As regards the semantic function of a vākya, the 
Mīmāṃsakas including Jaimini and Śabarasvāmin 
strongly held the opinion that, as illustrated above, 
the unity of the meaning (arthaikatva) is the factor 
to decide if a set of words is a vākya. The essence 
of this view maintained by Mīmāṃsakas in general 
was acceptable to Bhartṛhari too even though he 
rejected the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas’ view that the 
sentential meaning is to be understood in 
compliance with the abhihitānvayavāda or the 
‘theory of semantic signification antecedent to 
syntactic connection’.  
2. 2 Definitions of the Vākya in the Vākyapadīya 
The identity of the vākya was among the most 
vexed topics with which the philosophers and the 
grammarians at the time Bhartṛhari flourished had 
divergent preoccupations. Although his own 
overall treatment of the topic was rather different, 
Bhartṛhari succinctly summarizes in the very 
beginning of the Vākyakāṇḍa the definitions of the 
vākya up to his time by blending some of his views 
therewith.30 The description is limited only to two 
kārikās followed by the author’s gloss. A number 
of different readings and interpretations exist but 
the commentators are not in complete agreement 
with the content. However, as Puṇyarāja in his Ṭīkā 
commentary explains, eight definitions are 
commonly accepted to be included in those 
kārikās. Of them, only three definitions purely 
represent the ‘semantic signification subsequent to 
syntactic connection theory’ (anvitābhidhānavāda). 
The rest associates with the Mīmāṃsakas’ stance 
on the vākya where, however, Bhartṛhari’s holistic 
view on the vākya (akhaṇḍapakṣavāda) is also 
moderately embedded. Below is how Puṇyarāja 
describes the division of the definitions into 
different categories. 
I. Semantic Signification subsequent to 




c. pṛthak sarvapada sākāṅkṣa  
Doctrine of the Indivisibility of an 
expression (akhaṇḍapakṣavāda) 
a. jāti-saṅghātavartinī  
b. eka-anavayava-śabda 
c. buddhi-anusaṃhṛti 
II. Semantic Signification antecedent to 
Syntactic Connection Theory 
(Abhihitānvayavāda) 
Doctrine of the Divisibility of an 
expression (khaṇḍapakṣavāda) 
                                                          
30 VPpr. 2. 1. 2; Cf. Raja, 1969, pp. 206-210. 
a. saṅghāta 
b. krama 
Each definition can be explained briefly as follows. 
The first three of the first category are in harmony 
with the form of the anvitābhidhānavāda which 
Bhartṛhari partially favors in the VP while the next 
three definitions have strong affinity to the 
indivisibility thesis. The literal meaning of each 
definition is given in the parentheses.  
1. Ākhyāta-śabda (expression with a finite verb)31 
This is basically the position maintained by the 
Sanskrit grammarians in general; a vākya must 
have (at least) one finite verb on which other 
semantic units in the vākya depend whether its 
syntax is either physical or mental. Once the verb is 
located and its meaning gets fixed during the 
process of understanding, the other words get their 
own meanings as well. Therefore, this definition 
supports the anvitābhidhānavāda. Further, as in the 
VPpr., a vākya where only one finite verb stands 
for the whole expression (as if one with only an 
imperative) makes sense through inference 
(anumāna)32 or implication (ākṣepa).33  
2. Pada-ādya (the word at the beginning)34 
As the very first word of a certain sentence may be 
capable of conveying its own meaning and its 
relation to other words in the sentence, that word 
per se can be recognized as a vākya. Such first 
words could be vākyas because they are highly 
contextualized and linked to the words in their 
syntactic vicinity. In the light of VPpr. 2. 17, we 
can imagine a situation as follows to instantiate this 
definition. There are two people, say A and B, who 
have been conscious of the only one cow seen 
nearby. By uttering some expressions such as 
‘drive the cow here’, ‘bring the cow’ or ‘tether her 
there’, A asks B to perform the action intended. 
                                                          
31 VP. 2. 326, 327. Katyāyana too believed that the verb 
‘acting as a vākya’ could be considered to be a vākya 
itself. Cf. Kātyāyana on P. 2. 1. 1 ākhyātaṃ 
sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyaṃ. 
32 VP. 2. 189, 328, 371, 372. 
33 VP. 2. 200; 3. 14.73. Cf. Matilal and Sen, 1988, p. 88; 
Matilal, 1990, p. 110. 
34 Kumārilabhaṭṭa’s definition of a vākya as the ‘last 
word’ (padaṃ-antyam) relates to this definition. 
Logically, the last word better seems to link all preceding 
units and to bring forth the unified meaning of a vākya. 
However, a vākya needs not necessarily to be a ‘set of 
words’ as even a single word can be a vākya if the 
criteria for semantic perfection suffice. Therefore, in 
such a situation, there is neither a first-word nor a last-
word due to the absence of a sequence (krama). For more 
disputations over and a detailed line of the arguments on 
this matter, see: Raja, 1969, p. 207 – 210. 
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Even if only the imperative is enunciated, since 
both the addresser and the addressee are physically 
present in the situation concerned and well aware 
of the context, upon hearing the command, B does 
not bother to find the object of the command (viz. 
the cow) or the properties of the object (viz. the 
cow’s physical features etc.). Therefore, the only 
component of the addresser’s expression which he 
pays his attention to is the imperative, the first 
word in each example above. Such first words are 
so highly saturated in meaning and contextualized 
that the subsequent rest only supports the first. As 
Bhartṛhari states, there is a view that the first word 
in such an expression can be defined as a vākya. 
3. Pṛthak sarvapada sākāṅkṣa (all words 
individually desire each other) 
As noted earlier, the reciprocal desire for perfection 
is the string that keeps the semantic units in a vākya 
connected together. When taken individually or 
separately (pṛthak), if such units still desire others 
in order to become meaningful, that original set of 
words is then a vākya. For instance, transitive verbs 
taken alone can hardly make sense by themselves 
as they often desire an object to perfect its 
meaning.  
Interpreting the second and third definitions above, 
Bhartṛhari designates them as viśeṣaśabda (special 
expressions).35 
4. Jāti-saṅghātavartinī (universal current in the 
sequence of words) 
Jāti is the universal or generic property of the 
referent. It is the generic form of the vākya that is 
independent of individual speakers’ idiosyncratic 
ways of saying it. Further, meaning is not grasped 
at the most external, idiosyncratic level of speech 
(vaikharī) but at the most internal, universal level 
(paśyantī) thereof. A set of words becomes a vākya 
if it can be treated as an indivisible unit which 
refers to a proposition with universality. Simply 
put, this could be the opinion that such a set of 
words refers not to a specific proposition but often 
to an undifferentiated proposition as in the example 
‘the cat sat on the mat’ which means ‘any cat’s 
natural sitting on any mat at any time’ in general 
but not a particular cat’s action in a given context. 
The Sanskrit grammarians after Bhartṛhari 
reintroduced this definition as the jāti-sphoṭa. 
     
5. Eka-anavayava-śabda (unified expression 
devoid of constituents)36 
                                                          
35 VP. 2. 17; 3. 5. 4. 
36 VP. 2. 56. 
This view appears to be somewhat akin to the Jāti-
saṅghātavartinī because, by being introduced as an 
indivisible meaningful unit devoid of components, 
the vākya in reality is taken to be only one string of 
words though spoken by different speakers in 
different spatiotemporal settings. This definition is 
supportive of the vākya-sphoṭa.  
6. Buddhi-anusaṃhṛti (that which is retained in the 
mind) 
Bhartṛhari takes this definition to be the one 
explaining the ‘internal sphoṭa’ or the innate 
flashing of the meaning on the mind. Therefore, the 
vākya is defined as a ‘complete piece of cognitive 
awareness’ (avyabhicāriṇī ekārthatā).37 According 
to this definition, the meaning is not obstructed by 
syntactic permutations, speakers’ idiosyncrasies or 
any other factor in the surface level but becomes 
subjected directly to the consciousness which is 
internal, self-perceived and unobservable by 
others.38  
7. Saṅghāta (collection of semantic units)  
The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas’ straightforward doctrine 
of semantic signification antecedent to syntactic 
connections (abhihitānvayavāda) is well 
exemplified here. A vākya is a collection of 
semantic units and such units have their own 
meanings both before and after being connected 
together to form a vākya. However, the 
Mīmāṃsakas generally accept that the mutual 
connection (saṃsarga) of individual units adds an 
‘additional meaning (ādhikya)’ to the vākya.39 
Hence, the meaning of a vākya is nothing else but 
the cumulative meaning of the individual semantic 
units (aneka-pada-saṃśraya)40 plus the newly 
added meaning through mutual linkages. Clear is 
that this definition is the very opposite of the 
contextualism strongly held by the Prābhākaras. 
8. Krama (sequence)41 
The words uttered as a series with a temporal 
sequence is defined as a vākya and the vakyārtha 
results from that sequence. The Sanskrit 
grammarians hold that we understand a set of 
words as meaningful because of its sequence 
whereas the same collection of words may bear a 
different meaning or may not even make sense at 
                                                          
37 Matilal, 1990, p. 97. 
38 Cf. VP. 2. 30 – 31. 
39 Cf. P. 2. 3. 50; MBh. I. 463. 9 - 464. 27 
yadatrādhikyaṃ vākyarthaḥ saḥ  [the meaning of a vākya 
is what is additional (to the cumulative meaning of the 
constituents)] as given in VPpr. 2. 41 - 42; Cf. Iyer, 
1983, p. 19.   
40 VP. 2. 42. 
41 VP. 2. 49 – 53. 
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all when presented in different sequential 
permutations. However, since by krama is meant 
the temporal sequence and krama is relevant only 
to the words but not42 to the syllables constituting 
the words, understanding of the meaning may not 
significantly be affected by an irregular temporal 
sequence alone.43  
Though these eight definitions are generally 
accepted to be what Bhartṛhari listed simply in two 
kārikās, some are of the opinion that they contain 
more or fewer definitions. Kumārilabhaṭṭa’s view 
that krama and buddhyanusaṃhṛti should be 
considered to be a single definition44 is an 
example to the attempts to minimize the number of 
definitions originally acceptable to Bhartṛhari. By 
contrast, many others expanded Bhartṛhari’s list up 
to as many definitions as ten or more. For instance, 
the Jaina recension of the VP, as made clear in the 
Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍa by Prabhācandra, 
includes not only the first word (pada-ādya) but 
also both the last word (pada-antya) and the word 
which expects another (pada-sāpekṣa) as possible 
definitions of the vākya.45  
3 Conclusion  
Given these vākya definitions in the VP where the 
indivisibility of the vākya is philosophized, it is 
clear that Bhartṛhari endorses only the first six as 
those pertaining to his philosophy in different 
proportions. The last two originally from the 
Mīmāṃsakas are squarely rejected on the ground 
that they are not as supportive of the indivisible 
vākya-sphoṭa as the first six. Bhartṛhari approves 
neither the khaṇḍapakṣa (both the linguistic 
atomism and the compositionalism) nor the form of 
contextualism put forth first by the Prābhākara 
Mīmāṃsakas.46 Precisely put, his thesis is rather 
that the vākya is a piece of unified understanding 
which does not have any prima facie divisions at 
                                                          
42 It is because the words can be arranged into sequences 
more easily and, in natural speech, the syllables are not 
articulated with a purposive pause. 
43 The Sequence as a significant factor in understanding 
the meaning is explained especially by philosopher-
grammarians on the sphoṭa such as Maṇḍanamiśra. A 
detailed account of this facet will be dealt with later. Cf. 
VP. 2. 115, 372, 379; Bhartṛhari employs the term āvṛtti 
to recognize the identity of the sequence. How the 
temporal pauses in pronunciation are treated as a 
criterion to distinguish between sentences was mentioned 
above. 
44 Cf. Pārthasārathimiśra in ŚV (Ślokavārtika) & NR 
(Nyāyaratnākara) kramo 
buddhyanusaṃhṛtirityetannirākaroti varya iti.  
45 PKM (Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa). folio 134; Cf. 
Śarmā, 1990, p. 110. 
46 Matilal, 1990, p. 97. 
the conceptual level experienced at the time of 
practical communication. Looked at from the 
speaker’s viewpoint, it is the complete idea ready 
to be conveyed. Similarly, it is what becomes fully 
settled in the listener’s mind when his 
understanding process completes. 
Accordingly, the vākya is a linguistic construction 
which has reached ‘the state of semantic self-
sufficiency’ and ‘the absence of expectation for 
further units in order to achieve semantic 
perfection’. Hence, if even a single word is capable 
of conveying a complete meaning (samāptārtha) 
without resorting to further linguistic constituents 
for being semantically unambiguous, it can be 
considered a vākya. The classic example sentences, 
‘vṛkṣa (the tree)’ and ‘vṛkṣaḥ tiṣṭhati (there is a 
tree)’ may well be two different vākyas with the 
potency of denoting two different meanings in 
keeping with their contexts.47 Likewise, a single 
finite verb may also become a complete vākya as in 
‘varṣati’ (rains). It is ‘a third person present active 
singular verb’ in grammatical analysis but is 
saturated enough to convey the complete meaning 
of the longer sentence ‘devo jalaṃ varṣati’  (viz. 
‘the rain-giver deity or cloud showers water).48 
Now it should be evident that a vākya does not 
necessarily need to be a ‘string of several linguistic 
units’. Thus, the English translation of the term 
vākya found particularly in the discourses on the 
philosophy of grammar should not be worded as ‘a 
set of words or linguistic components’ since doing 
so might both misinterpret the Sanskrit term and 
generate philosophical confusions. 
This construal also avers that Bhartṛhari treats the 
individual linguistic constituents in a vākya as 
those observable only in analysis but not in 
                                                          
47 VP. 2. 332 arthaprakaraṇābhyāṃ tu teṣāṃ svārtho 
niyamyate, Cf. VPpr. on the same kārikā. 
Here are raised the questions, if a word like vṛkṣa 
suffices to be considered as a vākya, why not to use it in 
all occasions and why to bother over longer vākya-s. The 
grammarians answer is that it is so owing to our 
preference for the economy of words (lāghava).  
48 VPpr. 2. 326; In the English declaratives like ‘it 
rains’, ‘it snows’ etc., the role of the subject word ‘it’ to 
convey the sense ‘raining’ or ‘snowing’ has also been 
debated among semanticists. Though grammatically 
required, whether the ‘it’ here is primary or ancillary has 
been a vital question as the finite verb ‘rains’ or ‘snows’ 
is capable enough to convey its complete sense.  
Cf. European philosophers like Adam Smith argue for 
the ‘perfect simplicity and unity’ of the impersonal Latin 
verbs like pluit (it rains) and against their longer forms. 
But some others oppose that view by saying that such 
verbs do have subjects implied in their roots; for 
instance, the subject of pluit is ‘rain’ itself. Cf. Gaskin, 
2008, pp.  30 – 31. 
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practical applications during communication.49 He 
further exemplifies this thesis by means of 
comparing the so-called ‘components’ of the vākya 
to the human sense organs and the vākya to the 
well-functioning human body itself.50 Just like the 
sense organs cannot function without the body the 
way they are supposed to, the linguistic 
components without being mutually connected as a 
vākya cannot produce a complete meaning and 
consequently will remain meaningless (arthavattā-
viraha).  
As understood from Bhartṛhari himself, his 
commentators and followers, a linguistic form 
marked by the semantic property nirākāṅkṣā 51 is 
then ‘linguistically capable enough’ to convey a 
complete meaning to the listener. However, a vākya 
free from further desire for semantic perfection 
may have also been supported considerably by the 
paralinguistic constituents of its signifier linguistic 
form(s) but Bhartṛhari does not explicitly discuss 
them. Though the VP deals with the language 
fundamentally in its spoken form rather than the 
written form, it does not provide any obvious 
interpretation to the paralinguistic features of 
human speech that could help a deficient 
expression compensate for its uncompleted 
meaning. However, Bhartṛhari’s position is that the 
elliptical sentences (or, as against perfection, 
deficient sentences) and self-sufficient sentences 
are totally different expressions in terms of their 
syntactic construction observable upon analysis. 
Thus, the VP considers that the ellipsis (vākyaśeṣa / 
vākyādhyāhāra) is understood in a variation of 
inference (aprāptyanumāna) by specific techniques 
such as exception (apavāda), specification 
(viśeṣavidhi) or prohibition (pratiṣedha).52 
Nevertheless, all in all Bhartṛhari never extends his 
clarification up to the paralinguistic properties such 
as volume, vocal pitch, intonation etc.53 and 
corporeal gestures including the facial expressions 
such as pout, grimace, glower etc. that accompany 
the former.  
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Prābhākara-Mīmāṁsā. Sri Garib Dass Oriental 
Series, No. 60. Delhi, India: Sri Satguru 
Publications. 
Śāstrī, G. B. (1959). The philosophy of word and 
meaning: Some Indian approaches with special 
reference to the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. Calcutta: 
Calcutta Sanskrit College.  
Śāstrī, G. B. (1980). A study in the dialectics of 
Sphoṭa. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Singh, N. K. (1997-2001). Encyclopedia of 
Hinduism. New Delhi: Centre for International 
Religious Studies, Anmol Publications. 
Strawson, P. F. (1992). Analysis and metaphysics: 
An introduction to philosophy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Tesniere, L. (1959). Elements de syntaxe 
structurale. Paris: Klincksieck. 
Tripati, A. K. & Bhandare, I. S. (eds.) (1974). 
Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass.  
Worthington, V. (1982). A history of yoga. London; 
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
 
